We generalize AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case. To do so, we first generalize the semantics of the single-agent case, based on the notion of interpretation, to the multi-agent case. Then we show that, thanks to the shape of our new semantics, all the results of the AGM framework transfer. Afterwards we investigate some postulates that are specific to our multi-agent setting. Finally, we give an example of revision operator that fulfills one of these new postulates and give an example of revision on a concrete example.
Introduction
AGM belief revision theory [1] has been designed for a single agent. A natural idea is to extend it to the multi-agent case. As in AGM, we consider the beliefs of one agent, that we call Y (like Y ou). But in this case this agent, in her representation of the surrounding world, will have to deal not only with facts about the world but also with the other agents' perception of the surrounding world. So, we will have to extend or generalize the single agent semantics in order to take into account this multi-agent aspect . Besides, in a multi-agent setting, we have to be careful about what kind of multiagent belief revision we study and consequently about the nature of events we consider. In this paper we are interested in private announcements made to Y . A private announcement is an event where Y learns privately (from an external source for example) some piece of information about the original situation, the other agents not being aware of anything. This piece of information might be factual or epistemic, i.e. about some other agents' beliefs. Finally, by private multi-agent belief revision, we mean the revision that Y must perform in case the private announcement of φ made to her contradicts her beliefs. So far, this kind of revision has not been studied.
In the case of private announcement, the other agents' beliefs clearly do not change. For example, suppose you (Y ) believe p, and agent j believes p (and perhaps even that p is common belief of Y and j). When a third external agent privately tells you that ¬p then j still believes p and you still believe that j believes p (and that j believes that p is common belief). This static aspect of private announcements is similar to the static aspect of AGM belief revision in a single-agent case: in both cases the world does not change but only agent Y 's beliefs about the world change. So, it is reasonable to expect that the AGM framework can be extended to private multi-agent belief revision. In this paper we propose a natural generalization. The central device will be internal models, of which AGM models are a particular case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall belief revision theory in the line of [14] . In Section 3, we first introduce the notions of multi-agent possible worlds and internal models in order to adequately represent agent Y 's perception of the surrounding world. We then propose an equivalent representation and we generalize the AGM framework to the multi-agent case. In Section 4, we investigate some additional rationality postulates specific to our multi-agent approach. Finally in Section 5, we give an example of a revision operator and an application of this operator to a concrete example.
Note 1.1
All the proofs of this paper can be found in the appendix.
The single agent case: the AGM approach
In this paper Φ is a finite set of propositional letters and L the propositional language defined over Φ. Often, the epistemic state of the agent is represented by a belief set K. This belief set is an infinite set of propositional formulas closed under logical consequence and whose formulas represent the beliefs of some agent, here called Y . However, we prefer to represent epistemic states by finite belief bases as it is easier to handle by computers. For that, we follow the approach of [14] .
As argued by Katsuno and Mendelzon, because Φ is finite, a belief set K can be equivalently represented by a propositional formula ψ: K = Cn(ψ) = {χ | ψ → χ}. So χ ∈ K iff ψ → χ. Now, given a belief base ψ and a sentence φ, ψ • φ denotes the revision of ψ by φ; that is the new belief base obtained by adding φ to the old belief base ψ and giving up some formulas if necessary to keep consistency. In fact, given a revision operator * on belief sets, one can define a corresponding operator • on belief bases as follows: ψ •φ → χ iff χ ∈ Cn(ψ) * φ. Thanks to this correspondence, Katsuno and Mendelzon set some rationality postulates for this revision operator • on belief bases which are equivalent to the AGM rationality postulates for the revision * on belief sets. These postulates express how a rational agent should revise her belief set when she receives incoming information that she believes to be true.
Remark 2.1
Here are the AGM rationality postulates:
worlds that satisfy ψ and thus correspond to M od(ψ). The other circles represent the ordering ≤ ψ : if w < ψ w ′ then w is within a smaller circle than w ′ and if w = ψ w ′ then w and w ′ are in between the same successive circles. So the farther an interpretation is from the inner circle, the farther it is from ψ. The interpretations in the hatched part are then the interpretations that satisfy φ and which are the closest to ψ. Therefore they represent M od(ψ • φ) = M in(M od(φ), ≤ ψ ).
¬φ φ ψ ψ
Fig. 1. AGM belief revision
Grove proposed another semantic approach based on a system of spheres [11] . But one can show that his framework can be recast in the one just described.
3 The multi-agent case
Some preliminaries
In this paper, G is a fixed set of agents such that Y ∈ G.
Epistemic logic
We first recall the basics of epistemic logic [12, 9] . An epistemic model M is a tuple M = (W, {R j | j ∈ G}, val) where W is a set of worlds, R j are accessibility relations indexed by agents j ∈ G and val is a function that assigns to each w ∈ W a subset of Φ. We define R j (w) by R j (w) = {v | wR j v} and |M | is the number of worlds in M . Finally, a KD45 G epistemic model is an epistemic model whose accessibility relations are serial, transitive and euclidean.
Classically, an epistemic model M is given with an actual world w a : (M, w a ).
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Intuitively, a (pointed) epistemic model (M, w a ) represents from an external point of view how the actual world w a is perceived by the agents G. The possible worlds W are the relevant worlds needed to define such a representation and the valuation val specifies which propositional facts (such as 'it is raining') are true in these worlds. Finally the accessibility relations R j model the notion of belief. We set w ′ ∈ R j (w) in case in world w, agent j considers the world w ′ (epistemically) possible. Finally, the submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S ⊆ M is the restriction 1 of M to the worlds {( j∈G R j ) * (w); w ∈ S} (where ( j∈G R j ) * is the reflexive transitive closure of ( j∈G R j ), see [7] for details). In case the submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S ⊆ M is M itself then M is said to be generated by S. Intuitively, the submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S contains all the relevant information in M about these worlds S.
Now we can define a language for epistemic models which will enable us to express things about them.
where j ranges over G, G 1 over subsets of G, and p over Φ. We also define L as the sub-language of L C without common belief operator C G1 . The semantics of these two languages are defined as usual as follows.
So agent j believes φ in world w (formally M, w |= B j φ) if φ is true in all the worlds that the agent j considers possible (in world w). For example, in the pointed epistemic model (M, w) of Figure 5 , agent Y does not know whether p is true or not: M, w |= ¬B Y p ∧ ¬B Y ¬p. Agent Y also believes that A does not know neither: M, w |= B Y (¬B A p ∧ ¬B A ¬p). Finally, agent Y believes that A believes that she does not know whether p is true or not:
Bisimulation
We now recall the definition of a bisimulation. Definition 3.1 Let Z be a non-empty relation between worlds of two finite epistemic models M = (W, {R j | j ∈ G}, val) and
We define the property of Z being a bisimulation in w and w ′ , noted Z : M, w M ′ , w ′ as follows.
1 Let M = (W, {R j | j ∈ G}, val) be an epistemic model. The restriction of M to a set of worlds S is the
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6 Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting
We say that M, w and
So, intuitively, two epistemic models are bisimilar if they contain the same information.
Characterization of finite models
Finally, we will also use the following proposition. 
This proposition tells us that a finite epistemic model can be completely characterized (modulo bisimulation) by an epistemic formula. For example, the pointed epistemic model (M, w) in Figure 5 is characterized by the following epistemic formula:
This proposition will be very useful to prove that the results of the single agent case of AGM belief revision theory transfer to the multi-agent case. In the AGM framework, one considers a single agent Y . The possible worlds introduced are supposed to represent how the agent Y perceives the surrounding world. Because she is the only agent, these possible worlds deal only with propositional facts about the surrounding world. Now, because we suppose that there are other agents than agent Y , a possible world for Y in that case should also deal with how the other agents perceive the surrounding world. These "multi-agent" possible worlds should then not only deal with propositional facts but also with epistemic facts. So to represent the other agents' beliefs (possibly about agent Y 's beliefs) in a multi-agent possible world, we introduce a modal structure to our possible worlds. We do so as follows. ) is a finite epistemic model M = (W, {R j | j ∈ G}, val) generated by w such that for all j, R j is serial, transitive and euclidean, and
• there is no v and j = Y such that w ∈ R j (v).
Let us have a closer look at the definition. The second condition will be motivated in the next section. The first condition ensures us that in case Y is the only agent then a multi-agent possible world boils down to an interpretation, as in the AGM theory. The first condition also ensures us that in case Y assumes that she is in the multi-agent possible world (M, w) then for her w is the only possible world. In fact the other possible worlds of a multi-agent possible world are just present for technical reasons: they express the other agents' beliefs (in world w). One could get rid of the condition that a multi-agent possible world (M, w) is generated by w but the worlds which do not belong to the submodel generated by w would not have neither philosophical nor technical motivation. Note that if we remove the constraints on the accessibility relations (seriality, euclidicity and transitivity) the results in this paper are still valid. We prefer to keep them because we find them more intuitive to model the notion of belief construed as conviction. Intuitively, this notion of belief corresponds for example to the kind of belief in a theorem that you have after having proved this theorem and checked the proof several times. In the literature, this notion of belief corresponds to Lenzen's notion of conviction [16] , to Gärdenfors' notion of acceptance [10] and to Voorbraak's notion of rational introspective belief [19] .
a (single-agent) possible world:
w : p, ¬q a multi-agent possible world: We see in Figure 2 that a multi-agent possible world is really a generalization of a possible world (or interpretation). The epistemic state of the agent being represented semantically by a finite set of possible worlds (or interpretations) in AGM, this leads us to introduce the analogue notion of internal model in our multi-agent setting. Note that in the single-agent case, an internal model boils down to a (non-empty) set of interpretations, so represents a belief set. Intuitively, an internal model is the formal model that agent Y has "in her head" and that represents how she perceives the surrounding world. This interpretation differs from Hintikka epistemic models (M, w a ), usually encountered in epistemic logic, which are supposed to represent objectively and from an external point of view how all the agents perceive the actual world w a .
Example 3.5
An example of internal model is depicted in Figure 3 Figure 3 and an epistemic model bisimilar to the epistemic model associated to Figure 4 is represented in Figure 5 . Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting 9 We can now motivate the second item of Definition 3.3. Indeed, if this item was not fulfilled then part of agent j's beliefs about Y 's beliefs (for j = Y ) would depend on the other multi-agent possible worlds of the internal model. This aspect of the notion of internal model is revealed when we define the notion of epistemic model associated to an internal model. Condition 2 ensures us that agents j's beliefs in a multi-agent possible world of a given internal model depend only on the structure of this multi-agent possible world. Condition 2 thus provides a kind of modularity to multi-agent possible worlds that will be useful in the sequel.
Alternative representation of internal models
For every internal model, the epistemic model associated to this internal model is a KD45 G epistemic model generated by the set of worlds R Y (w). The other way round, one can easily show that any KD45 G epistemic model generated from R Y (w) (for some world w of this epistemic model) can be equivalently represented by an internal model. 3 So we have two equivalent ways to represent the epistemic state of agent Y .
The second type of representation is much closer to usual epistemic models of standard epistemic logic. But we stress that the interpretation of our models are different from the interpretation of epistemic models in standard epistemic logic. Our models are built by agent Y in order to represent for herself the surrounding world, whereas the models of epistemic logic are built by an external modeler and represent truthfully how all the agents perceive the actual world. Formally, the main difference is that they have a single actual world whereas in our internal models we have a set of 'actual worlds' (the roots of the multi-agent possible worlds) representing agent Y 's uncertainty about the actual world.
Besides, the shape of internal models, based on the notion of multi-agent possible world, allows to generalize easily concepts and methods from AGM belief revision 3 This equivalence could be easily specified formally by stating that for all i and φ ∈ L
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theory, as we will now see.
The multi-agent generalization of the AGM approach
In the multi-agent case like in the single-agent case, it does not make any sense to revise by formulas dealing with what agent Y believes or considers possible. Indeed, due to the fact that positive and negative introspection are valid in KD45, Y already knows all she believes and all she disbelieves. So we restrict the epistemic language to a fragment that we call L C =Y defined as follows.
where ψ ranges over L C and j over G − {Y }.
Note that this definition does not rule out formulas of the form B A B Y p which deal with agent A's beliefs about agent Y 's beliefs.
We can then apply with some slight modifications the procedure spelled out for the single agent case in Section 2.
First the postulates for multi-agent belief revision are identical to the ones spelled out in Lemma 2.2 but this time ψ, φ and φ ′ belong to L C =Y . Now we define I G to be the set of all multi-agent possible worlds modulo bisimulation, and we pick the smallest multi-agent possible world among each class of bisimilarly indistinguishable multi-agent possible worlds. We define the set of models associated to ψ by
Let M be an internal model. Thanks to Proposition 3.2 we can easily prove the following fact.
We then get the multi-agent generalization of Theorem 2.3 by replacing interpretations I by multi-agent possible worlds (M, w). 
Proof. The proof follows the line of that of Theorem 2.3. It relies heavily on the fact (*).
The "if" direction is straightforward. For the "only-if" direction, the key is the definition of a faithful assignment for each belief base in terms of •. For any multiagent possible worlds (M, w) and (
This definition of the assignment is identical to the single agent case (see proof of Theorem 2.3).
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Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting 11 This similarity between Theorem 2.3 and Theorem 3.9 is depicted in Figure 6 . We see in this figure that possible worlds of AGM belief revision are just replaced by multi-agent possible worlds which are represented by triangles. Remark 3.10 (Important) We have picked only one of the theorems of [14] but in fact all the theorems present in [14] transfer to the multi-agent case. It includes in particular the following theorem, where ≤ ψ is a partial order instead of a total order: Revision operator • satisfies postulates (R1) − (R5), (R7) and (R8) if and only if there exists a faithful assignment that maps each belief base ψ to a partial pre-order
In summary, the concept of internal model allows for a straightforward transfer of the AGM framework and results.
4 Some considerations specific to our multi-agent approach
In this section we are going to investigate some multi-agent rationality postulates. Indeed, because we add a multi-agent structure to our possible worlds, it is natural to study how (agent Y 's beliefs about) the other agents' beliefs evolve during a revision process.
As said in the introduction, the events we study are private announcements made to Y , the other agents not being aware of anything. So the beliefs of the other agents actually do not change and agent Y knows this. Consequently, agent Y 's beliefs about the agents who are not concerned by the formula announced to her should not change as well. So, first of all, we need to define formally what are the agents who are concerned by a formula.
On the kind of information a formula is about
First note that an input may not only concern agents but also the objective state of nature, i.e. propositional facts, that we note pf. For example, the formula p∧B j B i ¬p concerns agent j's beliefs but also propositional facts (namely p). 
Definition 4.1
We define by induction the agents who are concerned by a formula as follows:
We then define a language L C C1 whose formulas concern only agents in C 1 , and possibly propositional facts if pf ∈ C 1 .
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Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting 13 where j ranges over C 1 , ψ over formulas of L C and p over A, where A = Φ if pf ∈ C 1 and A = ∅ otherwise. Now we define a notion supposed to tell us whether two pointed and finite epistemic models contain the same information about some agents' beliefs and possibly about propositional facts. 
Definition 4.6
Let M and M ′ be two sets of multi-agent possible worlds. We set
Some postulates specific to our multi-agent approach
As we said before, we study private announcement made to Y , the other agents not being aware of anything. So, in particular, Y 's beliefs about the beliefs of the agents who are not concerned by the formula should not change. This can be captured by the following postulate:
This postulate is the multi-agent version of Parikh and Chopra's postulate [8] . The example of the introduction illustrates this postulate: there φ = ¬p and φ ′ = B j p ∧ B j C G p. Now the semantic counterpart of (RG1):
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Let us consider the converse of (RG1).
And the semantic counterpart:
Unlike (RG1), (RG2) is not really suitable for revision because all the worlds representing Y 's epistemic state "survive" the revision process if (RG2) is fulfilled. This should not be the case in general because new information can discard some previous possibilities. This is however the case for update where we apply the update process to each world independently (see [13] for an in depth analysis). So (RG2) is more suitable for an update operator.
In fact (RG2) is similar to the propositional update postulate (
Postulates (RG1) and (RG2) together are equivalent to:
An example of revision operator
In this section we propose a revision operator based on a degree of similarity between multi-agent possible worlds defined very much in the same way as in [15] . Besides, for sake of simplicity, we assume that formulas representing belief bases and private announcements belong to the language associated to Y without common belief, noted L =Y :
where ψ ranges over L and j over G − {Y }. One should note that in this setting, the "if" direction of Theorem 3.9 still holds, but not the "only if" direction.
Mathematical preliminaries

Lexicographic ordering
We first recall the definition of an anti-lexicographic ordering.
k+1 . We set
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Now we define the Supremum of a set of tuples with respect to the anti-lexicographic ordering by using the supremum Sup of real numbers.
k+1 (where S is an index set which is possibly infinite).
and for all m < k,
where Sup is the usual supremum on real numbers.
This definition is well-founded because the supremum of a non-empty set of real numbers with an upper bound always exists. Finally, we check that this supremum of tuples does correspond to the maximum of tuples when this one exists.
where S is an index set which is possibly infinite).
n-bisimulation
Our definition of n-bisimulation is a slight modification of the definition of n-bisimulation in [4] [7].
Definition 5.4
Let M = (W, R, val) and M ′ = (W ′ , R ′ , val ′ ) be two epistemic models, and let w ∈ M ,
We recursively define the property of Z being nbisimulation in w and w ′ , noted Z : M, w n M ′ , w ′ :
Now we can define n-bisimilarity between w and w ′ , noted M, w n M ′ , w ′ by M, w n M ′ , w ′ iff there exists a relation Z such that Z : M, w n M ′ , w ′ .
Two worlds being n-bisimilar (with n ≥ 1) intuitively means that they have the same modal structure up to modal depth n−1, and thus they satisfy the same formulas of degree at most n − 1. For example, in the epistemic models of Figure 7 , we have M, w 1 M ′ , w ′ , but M, w 2 M ′ , w ′ is not the case.
The usual definition of Z being a bisimulation corresponds to Z : M, w n M ′ , w ′ for all n ∈ N * (N * = N − {0}). In fact, it suffices that two finite epistemic models be n-bisimilar up to a certain modal depth to be bisimilar, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5.5 [3] Let M and M
′ be two finite epistemic models and
Definition of the revision operator
First we are going to define a degree of similarity between two multi-agent possible worlds that will allow for an anti-lexicographic order.
Definition 5.6
Let (M, w) and (M ′ , w ′ ) be two multi-agent possible worlds, let v ∈ M and v ′ ∈ M ′ , let S and S ′ be two finite sets of possible worlds, and let M and M ′ be two sets of multi-agent possible worlds (possibly infinite). Let n = |M | · |M ′ | + 1 and k ∈ N. If E is a finite set of real numbers, we note m(E) the average of E, i.e. m(E) = 1 |E| e∈E e.
•
σ(v, v ′ ) measures a degree of similarity between the worlds v and v ′ . For example in Figure 7 , we have σ(w, w ′ ) = Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting 17 degree of similarity is the lowest possible because they differ even on propositional facts. Likewise, σ(S, S ′ ) measures a degree of similarity between the sets of worlds S and S ′ . Note also that 0 ≤ σ(S, S ′ ) ≤ 1 for all S and S ′ . If σ(S, S ′ ) = 1 then for all worlds v ∈ S there is v ′ ∈ S ′ such that v is bisimilar with v ′ , and vice versa, for all v ′ ∈ S ′ there is v ∈ S such that v ′ is bisimilar with v. So the degree of similarity between S and S ′ is the highest possible. If σ(S, S ′ ) = 0 then for all v ∈ S there is no v ′ ∈ S ′ such that v and v ′ agree on all propositional letters, and vice versa, for all v ′ ∈ S ′ there is no v ∈ S such that v and v ′ agree on all propositional letters. So the degree of similarity is the lowest possible. To be more precise, σ(v, S ′ ) is the degree of similarity of a world v with S ′ . So m{σ(v, S ′ ) | v ∈ S} is the average degree of similarity of a world v ∈ S with S ′ . Likewise, m{σ(S, v ′ ) | v ′ ∈ S ′ } is the average degree of similarity of a world v ′ ∈ S ′ with S. So the degree of similarity between S and S ′ is just the average of these two degrees.
) is a tuple which represents by how much two multi-agent possible worlds are similar relatively to their respective modal depth. For example in Figure 7 we have s
, 0, 0). Note that for a given modal depth we only compare the degree of similarity of worlds which have the same history (i.e. they are all accessed from w and w ′ by the same sequence of accessibility relations R j1 , . . . , R j k ). Doing so, in our comparison we stick very much to the modal structure of both multi-agent possible worlds. We also assume that j i = j i+1 because otherwise, by transitivity and euclidicity of the accessibility relations, we would have R ji = R ji •R ji+1 . Besides we take the average of their degree of similarity for every possible history in order to give the same importance to these different possible histories.
Definition 5.7
Let ψ ∈ L =Y and k = deg(ψ) + 1. We assign to ψ a total pre-order ≤ ψ on multi-agent possible worlds defined as follows:
The revision operator • associated to this pre-order ≤ ψ is defined semantically in the usual way (see Theorem 2.3) by:
So (M, w) is closer to ψ than (M ′ , w ′ ) when its degree of similarity with the models of ψ is higher than the degree of similarity of (M ′ , w ′ ) with the models of ψ. In the next section, we are going to motivate our use of anti-lexicographic ordering and explain why we compare the modal structures of the multi-agent possible worlds only until modal depth k = deg(ψ) + 1.
Properties of the revision operator
Proposition 5.8 Let (M, w) be a multi-agent possible world and ψ ∈ L =Y a satisfiable formula such
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This proposition tells us that, given a formula ψ of degree d and a multi-agent possible world (M, w), there is a multi-agent possible world that satisfies ψ and whose structure is the same as (M, w) beyond modal depth d. That is why, in s k (M od(ψ), (M, w)), we stop at modal depth k = d + 1 when we compare models of ψ with (M, w): we know that there is anyway a model of ψ whose modal structure is the same as (M, w) beyond this modal depth, so there is no need to check it further. Moreover, we would like to give priority to this similarity when we compare models of ψ with (M, w). That is to say, we would like to ensure that the models of ψ closest to (M, w) are such that their modal structure beyond this modal depth is the same as the one of (M, w). We do so by using the anti-lexicographic order defined in Definition 5.1.
The following proposition shows that we need to consider only finitely many models of φ in s
Proposition 5.9
Let (M, w) be a multi-agent possible world. For all k ∈ N * , there are finitely many multi-agent possible worlds (M ′ , w ′ ) such that
Corollary 5.10
Let (M, w) be a multi-agent possible world, ψ ∈ L =Y and k = deg(ψ)
In other words, this corollary tells us that
Finally, we have the following nice property.
Proposition 5.11
The assignment defined in Definition 5.7 is a faithful assignment. Therefore the operator • defined in Definition 5.7 satisfies the postulates (R1) − (R6). Besides, • satisfies also postulates (RG1).
Note that postulate (RG2) is not necessarily satisfied. This is reassuring because, as we said after Proposition 4.8, postulate (RG2) is not really suitable for revision operators.
Concrete example
The revision operators • we introduced so far were syntactic. But in fact we could also define revision operators directly on internal models. Indeed, as we said internal models are formal representations that agent Y has 'in her mind'. So we need revision mechanisms that she could use to revise her formal representation when she receives an input under the form of an epistemic formula. Such revision operators would then take an internal model and an input formula as arguments and would yield another internal model. The following definition gives an example of such a revision operator.
Definition 5.12
Let M be a set of multi-agent possible worlds and φ ∈ L =Y a satisfiable formula. We define the revision of M by φ, noted M * φ, as follows.
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where for all multi-agent possible worlds (M, w) and (M ′ , w ′ ),
where k = deg(φ) + 1.
The reason why we stop at modal depth k = deg(φ) + 1 is the same reason why we stopped at modal depth k = deg(ψ) + 1 for s k (M od(ψ), (M, w)) in Definition 5.7. It is because we know thanks to Proposition 5.8 that there is a model of φ and a multi-agent possible world of M which agree on their modal structure beyond modal depth deg(φ).
However, note that if M is an internal model then M * φ might be infinite and therefore not an internal model. The following proposition ensures us that it is not the case.
Proposition 5.13
Let M be an internal model and φ ∈ L =Y a satisfiable formula. Then M * φ is an internal model.
Example 5.14
Let us take up Example 3. 5 Figure 8 . The epistemic model associated to {(M, w), (M ′ , w ′ )} is depicted in Figure 9 .
Now, suppose that an external agent announces to agent Y privately that agent A believes p is true (formally B A p). This announcement contradicts of course her beliefs and she has to revise her internal model. The following proposition tells us that the revised model is {(M r , w r ), (M r ′ , w r ′ )}, which is depicted in Figure 10 .
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Proposition 5.15 A p) p 
Remark 5.16
This example suggests that we could strengthen and refine our postulate (RG1) and require more demanding and more precise conditions. For example, if φ = p∧B j B i q ∧ B i B j B i p, then this formula is certainly about propositional facts, about agent j's beliefs, and about agent i's beliefs: C(φ) = {pf, j, i}. But it is more precisely about propositional facts, about agent j's beliefs about agent i's beliefs, and about agent i's beliefs about agent j's beliefs about agent i's beliefs: S(φ) = {pf, (j, i), (i, j, i)}. So, what should not change during a revision by φ are all beliefs φ ′ whose corresponding set of sequences S(φ ′ ) does not intersect with S(φ), which includes here all formulas of degree higher than 3 (because deg(φ) = 3). Formally, this corresponds to refining (RG1) by the following postulate.
Conclusion
We have proposed a semantics to adequately represent agent Y 's perception of the surrounding world in a multi-agent setting. This semantics generalizes the single agent one of AGM belief revision theory. Then Proposition 3.2 has enabled us to generalize easily the (representational) results of AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case. Finally, we have studied two additional multi-agent postulates and we have given an example of a concrete revision operator that satisfies one of these multi-agent postulates.
The power of our approach is that it generalizes the (representational) results of AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case, and so thanks to the notion of internal model. In fact, if we consider in particular that there are no other agents than Y then our approach boils down to classical AGM belief revision theory.
In the literature of dynamic epistemic logic, there are works that also deal with private multi-agent belief revision ( [2] , [5] or [18] for example). However, their modeling approach is quite different from ours. The models built in their work are supposed to represent truthfully the situation from an external and objective point of view, as it is usually done in epistemic logic. So the shape of their models is different from our internal models as we said in Section 3.2.2. In that respect, they also often introduce in their models possible worlds that the agents do not consider consciously as being possible but that are nevertheless relevant to model the agents' epistemic states from an external point of view (these possible worlds somehow express what would surprise the agents). The revision mechanisms they propose rely heavily on the existence of these possible worlds without whom revision would not be possible. On the other hand, we do not explicitly introduce these possible worlds in our formalism in order to perform belief revision. Indeed, as we said, the agents do not consider these worlds consciously as being possible whereas in our approach we intend to model (by means of internal models) only the beliefs of a particular agent Y , which are assumed to be conscious. This explains and motivates why our methods are different from theirs. However we do not claim that they are superior: they are simply different because our modeling approach is different.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate other multi-agent postulates and other distances over multi-agent possible worlds. Another line of research would be to study multi-agent update as we have started in Section 4.2. Indeed, the results of [14] about propositional update transfer to the multi-agent case as well.
A Proofs of Proposition 3.2 and Fact (*)
Proposition A.1 (Proposition 3.2) Let M be a finite epistemic model and w ∈ M . Then there is an epistemic formula δ M (w) (involving common knowledge) such that
Proof. The proof can be found in [4] .
Proof. Let (M, w) be a multi-agent possible world. Then we set 
Proof. We assume that pf ∈ C 1 , the proof without this assumption is essentially the same.
• Assume M, w C 1 M ′ , w ′ . We are going to prove by induction on φ ∈ L C
The other way around we can show that if
As by hypothesis W ′ is finite, let φ(
. This is impossible by (*), so (**) is false. The other part of the definition of C 1 is proved similarly.
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Proposition B.2 (Proposition 4.5) For C 1 ⊆ C, all pointed and finite epistemic model (M, w), there is δ
• for all pointed and finite epistemic model (
We only sketch the proof. If pf ∈ C 1 , take
Proof. The "if" part is straightforward. Let us prove the "only if" part. Let φ ∈ L C =Y and let 
where S is an index set which is possibly infinite). Generalizing AGM to a Multi-agent Setting 25
If (l
Proof. We first need to introduce a technical device that will be used in the proof of the proposition.
A tree-like multi-agent possible world of height d is a finite pointed epistemic model (M t , w t ) = (W t , R t , V t , w t ) of height d generated by w t such that: 4 1. R Y (w t ) = {w t }; 2. for all j ∈ G, R j is transitive and euclidean; 3. for all v t = w t there are two unique sequences v t 0 = w t , . . . , v t n = v t and j 1 , . . . , jn such that
2 2 e e e e e e e e Fig. 12 . A tree-like multi-agent possible world of height 2
Now we can prove the proposition.
• One can easily show that there is a tree-like multi-agent possible world of height d, (M t , w t ) = (W t , R t , V t , w t ), such that: as follows.
-w ′ = w t . 4 Let (M, w) be an epistemic model generated by w. The notion of height of worlds in M is defined by induction.
The only world of height 0 is the root w; the worlds of height n + 1 are those immediate successors of worlds of height n that have not yet been assigned a height smaller than n + 1. The height of a (generated) model (M, w) is the maximum n such that there is a world of height n in (M, w), if such a maximum exists; otherwise the height of (M, w) is infinite.
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• Now we prove that P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)) is a multi-agent possible world. We first prove that P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)) is serial. • Because deg(ψ) = d and the restriction of P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)) to the worlds of height at most d is bisimilar to (M t , w t ), we get that P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)), w ′ |= ψ. (w ′ )) = 1 for all j 1 , . . . , j d+1 such that j i = j i+1 and j 1 = Y .
Therefore m{σ
• Finally, we define (M ψ , w ψ ) as the bisimulation contraction of P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)). Then all the results for P lug((M t , w t ), (M, w)) still hold for (M ψ , w ψ ) and besides (M ψ , w ψ ) ∈ M od(ψ). Proof. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma C.5
Let M = {(M 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (M n , w n )} be an internal model for agent j. 5 For all k ∈ N, there are finitely many multi-agent possible worlds (M ′ , w ′ ) for agent j such that ( * ) for all j 1 , . . . , j k with j 1 = j and j i = j i+1 , for all v ∈ R j 1 •. . .•R j k (w ′ ), there is (M i , w i ) ∈ M and v i ∈ R j 1 • . . . • R j k (w i ) such that M, v M i , v i .
Proof. First, note that every multi-agent possible world (M ′ , w ′ ) for agent j can be seen as the 'connection' of an interpretation (the root w) with a finite number of multi-agent possible worlds for each agent l = j. Now we prove the lemma by induction on k. k=1 Because Φ is finite, there are finitely many interpretations. So there are finitely many (valuations for the) roots of multi-agent possible worlds. By ( * ), there are also finitely many worlds accessible from each root modulo bisimulation. So, by the remark at the beginning of this proof, there are finitely many multi-agent possible worlds satisfying ( * ).
